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Abstract 
When environmental externalities are international-i .. e. transfrontier-they most often 
are multilateral and embody public good characteristics. Improving upon inefficient 
laissez-faire equilibria requires voluntary cooperation for which the game-theoretic core 
concept provides optimal outcomes that have interesting properties against free riding. 
To define the core, however, the characteristic function of the game associated with 
the economy (which specifies the payoff achievable by each possible coalition of players­
here, the countries) must also specify in each case the behavior of the players which are
not members of the coalition. T his has been for a long time a major unsolved problem 
in the theory of the core of economies with many producers of a public good. 
Among the several assumptions that can be made in this respect, a plausible one 
is defined in this paper, for which it is then shown that the core is nonempty. T he 
proof is constructive in the sense that it exhibits a solution (i.e., an explicit coordinated
abatement policy ) that has the desired property of nondomination by any proper coalition
of countries, given the assumed behavior of the other countries. 
The Core of an Economy With Multilateral 
Environmental Externalities* 
Parkash Chander Henry Tulkens 
1 Introduction
We deal in this paper with an economy with several agents, whose productive activities 
generate "multilateral" externalities, i.e. , externalities that each one of them can both 
generate and be a recipient of. We have in mind externalities that are detrimental for the 
recipients. We also call these externalities "environmental" because we assume that they 
exhibit public goods (actually, public "bads" ) characteristics in the sense that when they
are generated, they affect all agents in the economy. We should also call them "additive" 
because we further assume that what is received by any recipient is simply the sum of 
what is emitted by the various generators. 
Being motivated by an interest of long standing1 for the sources of cooperation be­
tween countries on issues of transfrontier pollution (an excellent example of multilateral
environmental externalities) , we call upon the cooperative game theoretic concept of core
for identifying joint actions that would improve upon inefficient laissez-faire equilibria by 
means of voluntary cooperation, and achieve more than mere optimality. In this inter­
pretation, our model below is to be seen as that of an international economy, with the 
*Acknowledgements are due to Karl Goran Maler for numerous fruitful discussions and his hospital­
ity at the Beijer International Institute for Ecological Economics, Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, 
Stockholm, during May-June 1992. We have also benefitted from seminar presentations at the workshop 
"Environment: Policy and Market Structure", CORE, and Copenhagen Business School. The research 
was initially stimulated by the European Science Foundation programme, "Environment, Science and 
Society". The first author is grateful to California Institute of Technology for providing a stimulating 
environment for completing this research. The second author thanks the Fonds de la Recherche Fonda­
mentale Collective, Brussels (convention n°2.4589.92) and the Commission of the European Communities
(DG XII) for their support.
1 A first version of the international environmental model alluded to here appeared in TULKENS 
1979, and was elaborated upon from a game theoretic point of view in CHANDER and TULKENS 1991 
and 1992a and b. 
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countries being also the players in the games associated with it. 2 Other interpretations 
are conceivable, however. 
To define the core, the characteristic function of the game-which specifies the payoff 
achievable by each possible coalition of players-must also specify, in the case of games 
with externalities, the behavior of the players which are not members of the coalition. 
This is a disputed issue, and alternative assumptions in this respect lead to alternative 
core concepts such as, e.g. the a- and /3 -cores, which are contrasted to each other in an
externalities context by SCARF 1971, STARRETT 1972 and LAFFONT 1977 (chapter
V).3 In discussing his externalities model applied to acid rains, MALER 1989 claims that
the core concept (actually a particular version of the a-core, as we shall show below) is
useless because it results in too large a set of outcomes. 
Among the several assumptions that can be made on the behavior of players outside 
each coalition, we propose one in this paper which we think is a plausible one in the 
context of environmental externalities, and for which we show that the core is nonempty. 
The proof is constructive in the sense that it exhibits a solution (i.e., an explicit coor­
dinated abatement policy, in our pollution interpretation) that has the desired property
of nondomination by any proper coalition of players, given the assumed behavior of the 
other players. 
2 The Model of an Economy with Multilateral En­
vironmental Externalities 
The agents of the economy (countries in our international interpretation) are indexed by
i and denoted by the set N = {i Ii= 1, 2, ... , n}. Three categories of commodities are
considered: ( i) a standard private good, whose quantities are denoted by x � 0 if they
are consumed, and by y � 0 if they are produced; ( ii) pollutant discharges, the quantities
of which are denoted by p � O; and ( iii) ambient pollutant quantities, denoted by z ::; 0.
Each agent i's preferences are represented by a utility function ui (xi, z) satisfying:
Assumption 1: ui(xi, z) = Xi+ vi (z), quasi-linearity; and
Assumption 2: vi(z) concave, differentiable and such that �; 1Ti (z) > 0 for all z � 0.
With each agent i there is furthermore associated a technology, described by the 
production function Yi = gi (Pi), satisfying:
Assumption 3: gi (Pi) strictly concave and differentiable over an interval; and
2The "acid rain game" of MALER 1989 is a similar international environmental model, to which we 
intend to apply, in CHANDER and TULKENS 1994, the concepts and results developed here. 
3The issue also arises in games associated with economies with public goods, as in FOLEY 1970, 
CHAMPSAUR 1975, MOULIN 1987 and CHANDER 1993. 
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Assumption 4: There exists a Pi > 0 such that
d 
. {
> 0 if Pi < Pi (i) 
dYi ri (Pi) = 0 if Pi 2': Pi (ii) Pi = oo if Pi = 0. (iii) 
Inputs, which are not explicitly mentioned in the production functions, are subsumed 
in the functional symbols 9i· Although this amounts to treat them as fixed in the analysis
that follows, our results will not rest in an essential way on that assumption, which is 
made here mostly for expositional convenience. 
Finally, all possible behaviors within the economy, in terms of the consumption, pro­
duction and pollutant discharge decisions taken by its agents, as well as in terms of the 
resulting values of ambient pollutant are formally described by feasible states: 
Definition 1: Feasible states of the economy (or "allocations" ) are vectors
such that 
and 
L Xi :::; L 9i (Pi) 
iEN iEN 
z = - LPi· 
iEN 
(1) 
(2) 
3 Efficient and Equilibrium States of the Economy
To provide background to our search for an appropriate core concept, which is of a 
cooperative nature, we first define in this section efficient states of which core allocations, 
when they exist, are a subset, and then define various equilibrium concepts intended to 
describe alternative states of the economy under either absence of cooperation or only 
partial cooperation. 
Definition 2: A Pareto efficient state of the economy is a feasible state (x, p, z) such
that there exists no other feasible state (x', p', z' ) for which v,i (x� , z' ) 2': v,i (xi , z) for all
i E N with strict inequality for at least one i.
To characterize efficient states, the usual first order conditions take in this case the 
form of the following system of equalities: 
3 
L 7rj(z) = /li (Pi), i = 1, 2, . . .  , n.
jEN 
(3) 
Henceforth, we shall always write 7rN for L.jEN 'lrj· Notice that, due to Assumption
4(iii) , one has Pi > 0 for all i in any efficient state. It is easily seen that there exists a
Pareto efficient state. 
Proposition 1: Assumptions 1 and 3 imply that in all Pareto efficient states, the vector
of emission levels (p1, ... , Pn) is the same.
Proof: Suppose not, and let ( x, p, z) and ( x, p, z) be two states, both Pareto efficient,
with Pi "I- Pi for some i. On the one hand, if z = z, then 7rN(z) = 7rN(z) implies by (3)
that "Yi (Pi) = "ti(Pi) Vi E N; but this, by strict concavity of all functions gi (Pi) , is only
possible if Pi = Pi Vi. If, on the other hand, z "I- z, say z < z without loss of generality,
the fact that 7rN(z) 2:: 7rN(z) now implies by (3) that "Yi(Pi) 2:: "Yi (Pi) Vi, which in turn
implies by concavity that Pi :::; Pi Vi. However, since z = - L.iEN Pi and z = - L.iEN Pi,
one would have z 2:: z, which is a contradiction.
Q.E.D. 
I 
Let x0 = L.iEN 9i (pi). Then x0 is the maximum amount of total consumption.
We now consider each agent i of our economy as a player in an n-person noncooperative 
game. To this effect, let 
be the strategy set of player i, and T = T1 x ... x Tn be the space of joint strategies of
all players. Any joint strategy choice [ (x1, p1), ... , (xn, Pn)] E T of the players induces a
feasible state (x, p, z) of the economy if (x, p, z) satisfies (1) and (2).
Then, if for each i = 1, . . .  , n and any [ (x1, p1), ... , (xn, Pn)] E T we choose ui ( xi, z) =
Xi+ vi (z) with z = - L.jEN Pj as the payoff for player i, and write u = (u1, ... , un), we
have defined a noncooperative game [N, T, u], associated with the economy.
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Definition 3: For the noncooperative game [N, T, u] , the joint strategy choice [ (x1, p1), ... , (xn, Pn)]
is a Nash equilibrium if for all i E N, (xi, Pi, z) maximizes Xi + vi (z) subject to
Xi ::::; 9i (Pi) and Pi+ z = - E#iPj· 
Definition 4: For the economy, a disagreement equilibrium is the state (x1, • . •  , Xn; p1, • • .  , Pn; z) 
induced by the Nash equilibrium [ (x1,p1), ... , (xn,Pn)] of the game [N, T, u]. 
To characterize a Nash equilibrium or a disagreement equilibrium, the first order 
conditions of the maximization problem in Definition 3 yield the well known system of
equalities: 
(4) 
From the fact that the system ( 4) differs from ( 3), the standard statement is derived
that a disagreement equilibrium is not an efficient state of the economy. Furthermore, it 
will be useful to establish the following two properties: 
Proposition 2: For the game [N, T, u] there exists a Nash equilibrium which is unique.
Proof The existence of a Nash equilibrium follows from standard theorems (see, e.g. ,
FRIEDMAN 1990) , whose conditions require that each player's strategy set be compact 
and convex, and each player's payoff function be concave, continuous, and bounded. All 
these conditions are obviously met in our model. 
To prove uniqueness of the equilibrium [ (x1,p1), ... , (xn,Pn)J, suppose contrary to the
assertion that there exists another Nash equilibrium 
Without loss of generality assume that EPi ::::; EPi, entailing i = - EPi ;::: z = - EPi·
From the characterization of the disagreement equilibrium and the concavity of the func­
tions vi(z), we would then have 7ri (i) ::::; ni (z) as well as 'Yi (Pi) ::::; "fi (Pi) for each i E N.
But given the concavity of the production functions, this last inequality would imply 
that Pi ;::: Pi for each i E N, which contradicts the assumption that EPi ::::; EPi, and
[ (x1,fJ1), ... , (xn,Pn)] =I- [ (x1,P1), ... , (xn,Pn)].
Q.E.D. 
I 
Turning to the economy, the existence and uniqueness of a disagreement equilibrium 
state is also established by Proposition 2. 
Definition 5: For the noncooperative game [N, T, u] , the joint strategy choice [ (ff1,Pi
), ... , (ffn,Pn)] is a strong Nash equilibrium if for all SC N, 
5 
[ (�i)iES, �] maximizes L [xi+ vi (z)] 
iES 
subject to L Xi :::; L 9i(Pi) 
iES iES 
and L Pi + z = 
{ 0 if S = � .
iES - 2:.jEN\S Pj if s =I= N.
(5.a) 
(5.b) 
(5.c) 
Note that, unlike the Nash equilibrium, a strong Nash equilibrium, if one exists, 
induces a Pareto efficient state of the economy. 
Proposition 3: For the game [N, T, u] , there does not exist a strong Nash equilibrium.
A proof of Proposition 3 follows from Proposition 2, which shows that the Nash
equilibrium is unique, and the observation made earlier that the Nash equilibrium does 
not induce a Pareto efficient state of the economy. Since a strong Nash equilibrium is 
also a Nash equilibrium and induces a Pareto efficient state of the economy, it follows 
that there exists no strong Nash equilibrium for the game [N, T, u].4
BERNHEIM, PELEG, and WHINSTON (1987) note that strong Nash equilibria al­
most never exist or the strong Nash concept is "too strong" . Therefore, they propose an 
alternative equilibrium concept: namely; coalition-proof Nash equilibrium. However, as 
in the case of strong Nash equilibrium, the concept of coalition-proof Nash equilibrium 
involves the assumption that when a coalition deviates, it takes as given, the strategies 
of the complement. 5 
Turning to the cooperative part of our analysis, let us now associate, with every 
coalition S, the number w(S), called the "worth" of the coalition S and defined as the
highest aggregate payoff "2:.iES ui that the members of the coalition can achieve using some
strategy. Thus, the pair [N, w(.)] ,  consisting of the players set N and the characteristic
function w ( . ) , defines a cooperative game (with transferable utilities) associated with our
economy. 
Stated in full, the characteristic function reads 
w(S) = l:: [xi + vi (z)]. (6) 
iES 
For the association of this function with our economy to be meaningful-i.e. to cor­
respond to feasible states, the variable z should satisfy condition (2). However, this
equality involves strategic choices made by players who are not members of S. Thus, the
4MALER (1989) shows that there exists no strong Nash equilibrium for the "acid rain game". 
5Moreover, it can be shown that for the game [N, T, u] no coalition-proof Nash equilibrium is Pareto 
efficient, if there exists one at all. 
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worth of a coalition in our game is not only a function of actions taken by its members, 
but also of actions of players outside the coalition. 
This typical feature of cooperative games associated with economies with externalities 
and/or public goods requires the characteristic function to specify explicitly what the
actions are of both the members of S and of the other players. A familiar way to get
around this problem has been to assume that the players outside the coalition adopt those 
strategies that are least favorable to the coalition. That is, the characteristic function is 
defined as 
w°'(S) = max{x; ,iES,z} L[Xi + vi (z)]
iES 
subject to L Xi :::; L gi(Pi) 
iES iES 
(7.a) 
(7.b) 
(7.c) 
Games with characteristic function of this type are used in many studies of economies 
with public goods (see, e.g. ,  FOLEY 1970, CHAMPSAUR 1975, MOULIN 1987 and
CHANDER 1993). This is also the case with the game used by SCARF 1971 in his study
of economies with externalities: his "a-characteristic" function is similar to the one 
defined above. Pushing the "pessimistic" view to the extreme, MA.LER 1989 assumes
in his model that there is no upper bound such as our Pi for the individual pollutant
discharges; thus, coalitions can be hurt by up to infinite amounts of pollutants emitted by 
players outside the coalition. Such strategies may, however, not maximize the individual 
payoffs of these players. 
On the one hand, the notions of strong Nash equilibrium and coalition-proof Nash 
equilibrium assume that when a coalition deviates it takes as given the strategies of its 
complement. On the other hand, the notion of a-core presumes that when a coalition 
deviates, its payoff is what it would get when members of the complementary coalition 
act to minimax this coalition payoff. There is no reason why the complimentary coalition 
should behave in this war-like fashion, and there is no reason for the deviating coalition 
to necessarily expect or fear such behavior. 6 
We therefore introduce a concept in which when a coalition deviates it does not take 
as given the strategies of its complement, nor does it fear the worst. It instead looks 
ahead to a resulting equilibrium that its actions induce. More specifically, we assume 
that when S deviates, the members of N\S break-up into singletons and the resulting
equilibrium is the Nash equilibrium between S and the remaining players with members 
of S playing best response to the strategies of others. 7 
6 A similar conceptual criticism can be made of the /3-core. 
7 Our analysis might be extendable to the case when N\S may continue as a coalition, but we do not 
pursue this possibility in the present paper. 
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Let S c N be some coalition and, associated with it, the set rs defined as
Ts= {(xi, Pi)iEslO �Pi �pf, Xi ;::::: 0, Vi E S; L Xi � L 9i (Pi)}, (8) iES iES 
that is the set of strategies accessible to the members of S as a coalition. As the last 
inequality in this definition allows for some members of S possibly to consume more, or 
less, than what they produce, such a strategy set includes the possibility of transfers of 
private goods among the members of the coalition. The inequality also implies that the 
algebraic sum of these transfers be zero within the coalition. 
We now introduce the following concept: 
Definition 6: For the economy, given a coalition S, a partial agreement equilibrium
with respect to S is the joint strategy choice [ (x1,p1) ,  ... , (xn, Pn)] ET where
(i) [ (xi)iES, z] maximizes 2:[xi + vi (z)]
iES 
subject to L Xi � L 9i (Pi) 
iES iES 
and LPi + z = - L Pj, 
iES jEN\S 
(ii) Vj E N\S, (xj, z) maximizes Xj + vj(z) 
and Pj + z = - LPi, and
i#j 
(iii) 
(9.a) 
(9.b) 
(9.c) 
(9.d ) 
(9.e) 
(9.J ) 
(9.g) 
The joint strategy choice that induces this state of the economy may be seen as a 
Nash equilibrium[(x1,p1) ,  ... , (xn, Pn) ] between the coalition S acting as one individual
player and the other players acting alone. 
In terms of first order conditions, a partial agreement equilibrium [(x1, p1) ,  ... , (xn, .Pn)] 
with respect to a coalition S is characterized by the system of n equalities:
8 
'E 1fj (z) = 'Yi (Pi), i E s
jES 
and 
where 
Z= - LPi·
iEN 
Proposition 4: For any proper coalition SC N, 
(i) there exists a partial agreement equilibrium with respect to S; 
(ii) the individual emission levels corresponding to such equilibrium are unique; 
(iii) the individual emission levels of the players outside S are not lower than those at
the disagreement equilibrium, 
(iv) although the total emissions are not higher. 
Proof The existence proof follows from similar arguments as in Proposition 2. The
uniqueness of individual emission levels follows from similar arguments as in Proposition 
1. We therefore only formally prove here the remaining two parts of the proposition.
Let z = - L, Pi and z = - L, Pi, where (fJ1, ... , Pn) and (f51, ... , f5n) are the emission
levels corresponding to a partial agreement equilibrium with respect to S and to the
disagreement equilibrium, respectively. We first show that z � z. 
Suppose contrary to the assertion that z < z. We must then have 7ri (z) � Ki (z) for
each i E N. From the characterizations of a partial agreement equilibrium and of the
disagreement equilibrium it follows that 
and 
'E 1fj (z) = 'Yi (Pi) � 'Yi (f5i) = 1ri (z), Vi E sjES 
9 
From the strict concavity of each function gi, it follows that Pi ::::; Pi for each i E N. But
this contradicts our supposition that z < z. Hence, we must have z?:: z.
Finally, since z ?:: z, n"j(z) ::::; 7rj(z) for each j E N\S. The inequalities above and
strict concavity of gj imply that Pi ?:: Pi for each j E N\S.
Q.E.D. 
I 
Note that in view of Assumption 2, the total emissions corresponding to a partial
agreement equilibrium with respect to a coalition of two or more players are strictly 
lower than those corresponding to the disagreement equilibrium. This means that as 
compared to the disagreement equilibrium, the players outside a coalition of two or more 
players are strictly better-off at a partial agreement equilibrium with respect to that 
coalition-which is actually a form of free riding on the part of those players. 
We introduce now an alternative characteristic function-hence an alternative game; 
namely, the game [N, w'] defined by the "partial agreement" characteristic function:
subject to L xi ::::; L gi (Pi) 
iES iES 
and LPi + z = - L Pj, 
iES jEN\S 
where Vj E N\S, ( xj, z)maximizes Xj + vj(z) 
and Pi+ z = - LPi· 
i#j 
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(10.a) 
(10.b) 
(10.c) 
(10.d ) 
(10.e) 
(10.f) 
Here it is assumed that when coalition S forms, the players outside the coalition choose
their strategies according to Nash behavior, given the strategies of others, so as to max­
imize their own individual payoffs. And S knows this and similarly chooses its strategy
(acting as one individual player) so as to maximize its own payoff. The worth of coalition
S is therefore equivalent to its payoff that corresponds to a partial agreement equilib­
rium with respect to S. It is thus not assumed that the players outside the coalition S 
do the worst; nor is it assumed, as in the concepts of strong and coalition-proof Nash 
equilibria, that they do not react to the actions of S. Instead they are assumed to act
noncooperatively so as to reach an equilibrium in their own best individual interest. 
It may be noted that for each S, the value assigned by the "partial agreement"
characteristic function w"f is at least as much as that assigned by the "a-characteristic"
function w°', i.e. , w'Y(S) � w°'(S) for each SC N. In fact, examples can be constructed
such that w'Y(S) > w°'(S) for all SC N. This means that the core of the game [N, w"f] , 
i.e, the "11-core" is, if nonempty, contained in the "a-core" ; and possibly smaller.
If we assume that when a coalition S forms, the complementary coalition N\S also
forms and chooses the best response strategy for its members, given what S does, then
the core of the so-defined game, if nonempty, might be smaller than even that of the 
game [N, w'Y].8 
4 A Strategy in the Core of Games with Linear
Payoff Functions 
Thanks to the specification of a characteristic function, every strategy that a coalition 
may consider can be evaluated in terms of its aggregate payoff, and compared with 
the payoff yielded by strategies that other coalitions might contemplate. In particular, 
considering the coalition N of all players, we have:
Definition 7: A strategy of the coalition N is said to belong to the core of the cooperative
game [N, w] if the payoff it yields for each coalition is larger than the payoff w(S) that
any coalition S C N can achieve.
If it is impossible to find a strategy for N with that property, the core of the game is
empty. 
Emptiness or nonemptiness of the core typically depends upon the form of the char­
acteristic function, and more specifically upon the power that the game assigns to each 
coalition. In the presence of externalities, this power is crucially affected by the assumed 
behavior of the players outside the coalition. Thus, with the a-characteristic function, 
8CARRARO and SINISCALCO 1993 in a model with identical agents assume that when S forms and 
achieves the aggregate payoff w( S), if some i E S leaves S, the coalition S\ { i} remains formed. They
show that then it may be better for i to leaves S; as this advantage grows with the size of coalition, they 
conclude that only small coalitions can prevail, and N will never form. 
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coalitions are weakened by the presumed minimax behavior, letting hope that the cor­
responding a-core be nonempty, as is the case in SCARF 1971, in the version given by 
LAFFONT 1977 of the SHAPLEY and SHUBIK 1969 "garbage game" ,9 as well as in 
MALER's 1989 "acid rain game" . 
The former two results, however, do not bear on an economy with externalities of the
environmental type we are dealing with here, and Maler's argument is only an informal 
one. Furthermore, no results are available, to our knowledge, for the type of characteristic 
function we have introduced above. We therefore shall tackle directly, i.e. from scratch, 
our central issue of whether any core property can be established for the cooperative 
game defined in the previous section. 
To find out whether or not the core of any cooperative game is nonempty various 
approaches can be used. Two qualitative ones are offered by SCARF 1967 and SHAPLEY 
1971 who respectively show nonemptiness if the game is balanced or convex. None of 
these proved successful in our case. We therefore turn to another, constructive, approach, 
which is to exhibit a strategy and show that it satisfies Definition 7. 
We follow here this latter approach. Specifically, let ( x*, p*, z*) 
... , p�; z*) be the Pareto efficient state defined as follows
( x!, . . . , x�; P!,
(11) 
where 7ri = 7ri(z*) for each i E N  and (PL . . .  , p�) and (ih, . . .  , f5n) are the (unique) indi­
vidual emission levels corresponding to the Pareto efficient states and to the disagreement 
equilibrium, respectively. 10 By Pareto efficiency 7rjy = 'Yi (pi) for each i E N. 
As can be easily seen, the above implies that for each i E N, 
( x;, p;, z*) maximizes xi+ vi (z) 
subject to 
9This is also the case in the many studies of economies with public goods alluded to above of FO­
LEY 1970, CHAMPSAUR 1975, MOULIN 1987 and CHANDER 1993, where the unfavorable behavior 
consists in producing no public good at all; these have typically large cores. 
10CHANDER 1993 analyzes an instantaneous analog of this cost sharing rule in a public good context. 
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and 
Pi + z = 
-
LPj
#i 
0 �Pi � pf. 
This means that the state (xi, ... , x�; Pi, ... , p�; z*) is an equilibrium concept. As it can
be given an interpretation analogous to that of the ratio equilibrium (KANEKO 1977;
MAS-COLELL and SILVESTRE 1989), we shall refer to it as the ratio equilibrium 
with respect to the disagreement equilibrium.11 
We prove the nonemptiness of the core by showing that the ratio equilibrium with 
respect to the disagreement equilibrium belongs to the core of the game [N, w'Y ] . 
We first consider a special case of our general model, namely the one where it is 
assumed that the payoff functions are linear, i.e. : 
This is actually the case for which MA.LER 1989 proves the nonexistence of a strong 
Nash equilibrium. Note also that in SHAPLEY and SHUBIK's 1969 garbage game, the 
payoff functions are linear (unlike here, however, their externalities are directional and
involve no diseconomies of scale) .
As can be easily seen from the characterizations of the Nash equilibrium and of a 
partial agreement equilibrium, an important consequence of the linearity assumption is 
that in a partial agreement equilibrium with respect to a coalition the emission levels of 
the players outside the coalition are the same as in the Nash equilibrium. In fact, under 
the linearity assumption the Nash equilibrium is a dominant strategy equilibrium. 
Theorem 1 Under the linearity Assumption 1 ', the strategy for the grand coalition
N that induces the ratio equilibrium (x*, p*, z*) of the economy belongs to the core of
the game [ N, w'Y ] . 
Proof Suppose contrary to the assertion, that the strategy inducing (xi, ... , x�; pi, ... , p�; z*) 
is not in the core of the game [N, w'Y ] . Then there exists a coalition S c N and a strategy
for s inducing the feasible state (x1, ... 'Xn; f51, ... 'Pn; z) such that (x1, . . .  'Xn; f51, ... 'Pn; z)
is a partial agreement equilibrium with respect to S, and xi + ?fiz > xi + ?fiz* for all
i E S. From the characterization of a partial agreement equilibrium with respect to a
11 Note that one can also consider the Pareto efficient state defined as: xi = 9i(pi)- nf (LiEN 9i(pi)-nN Li EN 9i (pi)), i E N. But we are unable to establish the same properties for this Pareto efficient state.
It seems that the reference point matters. 
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coalition, it follows that Pi = Pi for all i E N\S, that Pi 2:: Pi for all i E S, and that
LiES Xi= LiES 9i (Pi)· 
Consider now the alternative efficient state (x1, ... , xn; Pi, ... , p�; z*), defined as:
Xi= 9i (Pi) - �i c�= 9i (Pi) - 2::::: 9i (p:)), i E N, 7rN iEN iEN 
z* = - LP: -
iEN 
We show below that, as far as the members of S are concerned, one has
which implies 
LXi + LKiz* > LXi + LKiz,
iES iES iES iES 
LXi + LKiz* > 2:::::x: + LKiz* 
iES iES iES iES 
if S is able to achieve Xi + Kiz > xi, + Kiz* for all i E S as it is supposed to do.
We further show that as far as the other players are concerned, 
(12) 
(13) 
(14) 
(15)
As together the inequalities (14) and (15) imply that the state (x1, ... , xn; pi, ... , p�; z*) 
is Pareto superior to the Pareto efficient allocation (xi, ... , x�; pi, ... , p�; z*), we get an
impossibility. Proving (13) and (15) will thus establish the theorem.
To show (13) , the definition (12) allows one to write 
""A "" - * "" (-) LiES Ki ( " (-) "" ( *)) "" - *L..,; Xi + L..,; 'lriZ = L..,; 9i Pi - - L..,; 9i Pi - L..,; 9i Pi + L..,; 'lriZ 
iES iES iES 7r N iEN iEN iES 
= L Xi - Li�S 
Ki ( L gi (Pi) - L 9i (P:)) + L Kiz* - L KiZ + L Kiz
iES 7rN iEN iEN iES iES iES 
"" - LiES Ki [- ( * -) ( "" (-) "" ( *)) l "" - -= L..,; Xi+ - 7rN z - z - L..,; 9i Pi - L..,; 9i Pi + L..,; 'lriZ·
iES 7r N iEN iEN iES 
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(16) 
From the respective characterizations of a Pareto efficient state, and of a partial agree­
ment equilibrium, we have for all i E N, ffN = 'Yi(pt) and Pi 2: p;_ Hence, the strict
concavity of each function gi implies
which in turn implies that 
ffN(z* - i) > L gi(Pi) - L 9i (P:).
Then (13) follows from (16) . 
iEN iEN 
On the other hand, from the respective characterizations of the disagreement equilib­
rium and of a partial agreement equilibrium with respect to a coalition, we have Pi ::; Pi, 
for all i E N, Pi = Pi for all i E N\S, and thus EiEN 9i (Pi) ::; EiEN 9i (Pi). Therefore,
These inequalities establish (15) . 
Q.E.D. 
I 
It was noted earlier that the core of the game [ N, w1'] is contained in the a-core.
Theorem 1 thus simultaneously establishes the existence of the a-core. 
Finally, note that the linearity of the payoff functions can be substituted by a slightly 
weaker assumption, namely: 
Assumption 1 " : For all S C N, S =/- N, ISi 2: 2, EiES ni (z*) 2: 7rj(z), j E S, where z and
z* correspond to the disagreement equilibrium and a Pareto efficient state.
Clearly, the condition is satisfied when the payoff functions are linear. It is easily seen 
that our results carry over to this case. 
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5 Nonemptiness of the Core Under Nonlinear Pay­
off Functions 
Doing away with the linearity assumption of course makes the interaction between the 
strategic variables more complex. To see this, note that the Nash equilibrium is no longer 
a dominant strategy equilibrium. We thus impose an additional condition on our general 
model. 
Assumption 3 ': For all i, j E N, 9i 
functions. 
gj, i.e. , the players have identical production
Note that this may appear to be restrictive, but such an assumption is very often made 
in the public goods literature. 12 In the environmental externalities model of CARRARO
and SINISCALCO 1993, as well as of BARRETT 1990, games are studied in which all 
the players are identical on both the production and the consumption sides. Similarly, 
MALER 1989 analyzes a game in which all players have identical characteristics. 
Henceforth, the production function of each player will thus be denoted simply by g 
and dg (pi)/dpi = ry (pi), i E N. We now note an important consequence of Assumption
3 ': 
Proposition 5: Under Assumption 3 ', the emission level of each player in the coalition
of a partial agreement equilibrium must not be higher than that corresponding to the 
Nash equilibrium. 
Proof Let S c N be some coalition, and let ( (x1,p1), ... , (xn, Pn)) E T be a partial
agreement equilibrium with respect to S. From Proposition 4, we have LiES Pi :S LiES Pi, 
where ( (x1, p1), ... , (xn,Pn)) is the Nash equilibrium.
Since the players have identical production functions, it follows from the character­
ization of a partial agreement equilibrium with respect to S that ry (pi) = ry (pj) for all
i, j E S. Thus Pi= Pj· Since LiES Pi :S LiES Pi, we have Pi :S Pi for each i E S.
Q.E.D. 
I 
Theorem 2 Under Assumption 3 ', the core of the game [N, w'Y] is nonempty.
Proof We show again that the ratio equilibrium (xi , ... , x�; p;', ... , p�; z*) is in the core
of the game [N, w'Y] . That is, the allocation defined as
12In fact, this brings our model closer to the standard one of pure public goods and thus our results 
can be extended to such a model. 
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where ((x1,p1), ... , (xn,Pn)) is the Nash equilibrium, 7r; = dvi (z*)/dz*, and z* = - E Pi­
From Pareto efficiency we must also have 7r"jy = !'(Pi) for all i E N.
Suppose contrary to the assertion that the above allocation is not in the core of 
the economy. Then there exists a coalition S C N, S -=/=- N, and a partial agreement
equilibrium with respect to S, [(x1,p1), ... , (xn,Pn)], such that
where z = - EiEN Pi· 
Xi+ vi (z) > x; + vi (z*) for all i E S, 
Define a new Pareto efficient allocation (x1, ... , xn; Pr, ... , p�; z*) as follows:
* 
Xi= g (pi) - 7["! ( L g (pi) - L g (p;)).1rN iEN iEN 
We claim that inequality (17) implies that 
iES 
and 
iES iES 
L Xi> L x;. 
iEN\S iEN\S 
iES 
(17) 
(18) 
(19) 
As these two inequalities together with (17) clearly contradict the Pareto efficiency of 
( xr' ... ' x�; pr' ... 'p�; z*) ' our theorem is proved if we establish them.
We first prove (18). By the definition of the new allocation, 
iES iES iES iEN iEN 
iES iES iEN iEN 
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using the concavity of the function g, as well as the Pareto efficiency condition (3); but
the last expression is equal to: 
Thus, 
that is 
iES iES 
L xi - (L 7r;/7f1v )7r1v(z* - z).iES iES 
iES iES 
> 'L xi + 2.:: vi ( z),iES iES 
iES iES iES 
(i.e. (18)) ,  since from concavity vi(z*) -vi (z) 2: Ki (z* - z) for all i.
Next we prove inequality (19) . By definition, 
I: g (f5i) - ( 'L Jr; /7r1v) ( 'L g (f5j) - 2.:: g (pj))iEN\S iEN\S jEN jEN 
'L g (tJi) - ( I: 7r;/7r1v)(2.:: g (pj) - I: g (pj))iEN\S iEN\S jEN jEN 
iEN\S iEN\S 
iEN\S jEN 
iEN\S iEN\S 
iEN\S jEN 
iEN\S iEN\S 
iEN\S iEN\S 
iEN\S iES 
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jEN 
iEN\S 
jEN 
iEN\S 
iEN\S 
iES 
As Propositions 4 and 5 imply that Pi 2: Pi for all i E N\S and Pi ::; Pi for all i E S, 
we have 'E,iEN\S Xi > 'E,iEN\S xi, i.e. (19)
Q.E.D. 
I 
6 Concluding Remarks
We have been able to show that it is logically possible to find a state of the economy 
such that no coalition S can do better for its members, when one assumes that the other
agents would play their best response strategies if S were to form. 13 This is true even in
the context of games for which no strong Nash equilibrium or Pareto efficient coalition­
proof Nash equilibrium exists. We take this as an argument supporting the view that 
full cooperation (coalition N) can prevail and a Pareto efficient state can be achieved.
Although the issue of how to find that state is not thereby resolved, the constructive 
result obtained in this paper invites further research in that direction. 
It seems that our analysis can be generalized to the case of a more general class 
of utility functions. However, we postpone this task to a later paper. Presently, our 
purpose has been to introduce the concepts and illustrate them in a simple context. The 
assumption of quasi-linearity of the utility functions leads to a more transparent analysis. 
We assumed that when a coalition S deviates the members of N\S break-up into
singletons. Although a generalization of our concepts to the case when N\S may continue
as a coalition is straightforward, the existence of a nonempty core becomes a problem. 14
13 As noted earlier, this result implies that this is also true when one assumes that the other agents do 
the worst they can. 
14It is only under such hypothesis that CARRARO and SINISCALCO 1993 arrive at the result that 
N will never form. 
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